„TopfDriver 25.04.202125.04.21 Klare Antwort:Was bedeutet für euch "Ein Mann, der weiß, was er will." ?
Mehr Schein! Als Sein!
Punkt.
„ Und das kannst Du natürlich anhand impirischer Studien belegen 🤦♂
Punkt.
Sie kann das nicht mit empirischen Studien belegen. Ich auch nicht.
Aber namhafte Wissenschaftler konnten empirische Hinweise in ihren Studien finden,
dass der freie Wille eine Illusion ist. Ob es ein Bewusstsein gibt ist wissenschaftlich auch noch nicht gesichert. Und nebenbei: DAS GILT SOWOHL FÜR Männer WIE FÜR Frauen.
Da es methodisch in diesem frühen Stadium
keinen Sinn ergibt nach "möglichen" Geschlechterunterschieden zu forschen.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-59827-6_1
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